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PREFACTORY NOTE
Richard H. Minear is professor of history at the University of Massachusetts
at Amherst. He studied European history as an undergraduate (A.8., Ya'le, 1960)
before doing his graduate work at Harvard (Ph.D., 1968) in Japanese history.
Although Edwin 0. Rejschauer figures prominently in this essay and was'in fact
the only Japanist Mjnear could have named in i960, Reischauer's term as American
Ambassador to Japan cojncjded with Minear's graduate study, and Albert M. Craig,
not Rejschauer, supervised h'is Ph.D. Minear js the author of Japne5g Tradition
and Western Law (Harvard University Press, 1970; Japanese translaTl-0n,19f1] anil
Vi-ctors'-JusfrTe: The Tokyp War Crimes :frjgl (Princeton University Press,
T971 ; Japanese tran s t a tlon ,tgTZ);-eAl to. of-l_lfg!g! Japa nese Eyef ( Praeger, I97 4) ;
and of many scholar'ly essays.
Professor Mjnear's first contact with Helen Mears'Mjrror for Americans: Japan
came j n 1977 when he purchased a copy at a used book store. ffrereaTter he tracked
down Helen Mears'in New York Cjty and has kept jn touch with her since. This
experience became a niajor stimulus for his recent series of essays on the h'istory
of Japanese studies (see, jn addition to the essays listed in footnote 3, "Orjent-
al'ism and the Study of Japan," Journal of As,ian Studies_ 39.3 (May 1980),
517, and "America, Japan, and Mirrors," a review essay comparing Mears'
Ezra Vogel's Japan as Number Q1e in The lggql Interpreter, forthcoming).
pp" 507 -
Mirror and
HELEN MEARS, ASIA, AND AMERICAN ASIANISTS
American Asianists are like the historians described by Charles H. Haskins
we "...find it easy to be historic;rlly minded respecting everything save only
,l
history."' We deal with Asia in its historical development, but about the
historical development of our own fields we know next to nothing. We are
adept at analyzing Chinese or Japanese or l(orean or Vietnamese views of the
outside world in relation to the international context of the time, but we
resist the treatment of our own fields in the 
"u*u "ur.,
Being ahistorical about history is particularly shortsighted for those
of us uncomforLable with the recent past and the current condition of our
f ields, for as diss ident minorities we need all the roots \^re can f ind. One
writer to whom the search for roots quickly leacls i" tt.t",-, Mears, author of
three books on Japan and a great many articles on Asia. Her writings form the
earliest and most inclusive postwar presentation of a revisionist approach to
the recent history of the Pacific. Her rethinking of Japanese history began
while the Pacific war hias still on. Before that wa was over she identified
the colonial issue as the crucial postwar issue. Before the Geneva Conference
of L954 she developed a strong case against American policy in Indochina.
Yet Mears vras too far ahead of her time. She was revisionist too early.
Her message was an uncomfortable one, and most Americans -- including most
American experts on Asia -- ignored her or patronized her work. But reading
her ideas today, we are struck with the currerlcy of her analysis and with the
extent to which she identified the major issues of the postr^rar Asian world,
issues which continue to be of critical importance in the 19BOs. Her ideas
are important ones, and we ignore them -- in 1948 or in 1980 -- at our or^in
peril.
Helen Mears.
Helen Mears is an intensely private person. Throughout her career she
has resisted interviewing, attempting always to focus attention on her ideas
and away from herself. Even today she becomes uncomfortable when the con-
versation turns to the sources of her commitments. Her biography, she feels,
belongs in a footnote, perhaps, but surely not in the text of an essay con-
cerning her ideas. Still, the story of her life is an important part of the
study of her ideas.3
Helen Ivlears was born in New York City in 1900. She grad.uated from Goucher
College in 1922. From her teens on, she wrote poems and essays, and she
aspired to write the great American novel. But it was not untiL IgZ5 that she
made the acquaintance of Asia. That meeting came in 1925, virtual-ly out of
the blue.
One of her college friends was the daughter of American missionaries in
China. En route back to China in L925, this friend suggested that Mears go
along. Mears did, leaving a job behind and setting off with no apparent means
of support. Arrived in China, she stayed a year, earning her keep as executive
secretary at Peking Union Medical College. She returned to America via the
Trans-Siberian Railroad, travelling -- characteristically -- third class.
Her next trip to Asia came ten years later, in 1935, when she started
off for India. She never got there. What was intended as a brief stay in
Japan lurned into an eight-month sojourn, and her experiences became the
subject of her first book, year of the wild Boar (Lippincotr, Lg42). The
title refers to the traditional Japanese calendar, according to which 1935
was the year of the wild boar.
In Wil.d Boar Mears sets out to consider "...how the Japanese actually
live their day-by-day round.rt The book is "a personal record," an attempt
-2-
trto understand, in its o\dn Eerms"4 a c.,lture very different from her own.
Through extensive interviewing and travel, and particularly through the wide
historical research and documenLation which are one Mears ha11mark, Mears gets
well beneath the surface. To assist the reader she personalizes many of the
issues, dealing with them as they affect her closest Japanese friends. Her
lengthy analysis of Japanese society and culture leads to the conclusion that
Japanese culture before Perry was "a brilliant solution for an economy of
\scarcity.'r- The impact of the machinc age as represented by perry forced
Japan into the cross-currents of Great Power pressures; and Mears devotes a
fu11 chapter late in the book to a presentation of a Japanese view of the
1930s.
Mears makes clear her own antipathy to Japanese acts in Manchuria and
China and to the atmosphere of political repression in Japan. She also speaks
out against the psychological repression r"ihich she sees as a major drawback
of Japanese culture. Still, for the most part she offers a non-ethnocentric
view. For example, in her conclusion she writes: "There was always the danger
of judging Japanese reactions from an American point of view, of assuming
that because an American found certain habits of living uncomfortable, the
Japanese must also find them uncomfortable; of assuming that because an
American found certain customs and restrictions intolerable, they were intol-
erable also to the Japanese. I had by now learned this lesson -- that the
Japanese civilization was as satisfactory to the average Japanese as the
American was satisfactory to the average Americau.,,6 And the major thrust
of her discussion of Japanrs dilemma in the 2Oth century is not to blame Japan
but to understand the total situation. She writes:
one thing \^ras sure. Now that the machine age had made isolation
impossible for any nation; norv that the machine age made the
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mildest of men as dangerous as the most aggressive; now that the
machine age could turn self-sufficient agricultural people in1o
dependenL, exporting people; now that the machine age could
create individual and national insecurity that could become
passionate aggressive nationalism -- it was essential, if the
world liere not simply to be given over to chaos, that all people
everywhere try to understand the probl-ems of all people, try to
work for an international- order. An order in which national
insecurity would be replaced by international co-operation; an
order in which all people rirere equal, regardless of race, color,
or previous condition of dependence; an order which would
destroy the Japanese racial propaganda, by destroying the
conditions on which it was based.T
This passage in l^Iild Boar clearly foreshadows the concerns of most of Mearsl
later work. Written Ln 1942, it rcmains relevant today to the issues which
have dominated the history of t.he pacific since that time.
George B. Sansom, already the senior statesman among Western Japanists,
was among the many reviewers who reacted with high praise. He vrrote: nlt
is very competently done. I do not know of any book in English which, within
its range, is more penetrating... She writes sensitively. I do not think I
have ever seen a belter piece of description, anything better felt and seen,
than the chapter... in which she pictures the countryside near Karnakura and
endeavors to learn what Shinto means to simple people. It is charmingly done,
truthful and penetrating..."8
Together with a series of essays in Ihe_-\ew Yorker (Mears was lhe firsl
to write of foreign affairs under thc byline'rour Far-Flung Correspondents,,)9,
Wild Boar established her credentials as a wrj-ter on Japan. It gave her
entree into academic and official circles. During t.he war Mears gave lectures
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on Japan to university and general audiences, and she attended various
conferences and symposia sponsored by the Institute for Pacific Relations and
other organizations. The Army set up Civil Affairs Trai"ning Schools (CATS)
as cram courses for people who would scrve in the postwar occupations, and
Helen Mears was one of the lecturers. Indeed, she had agreed to take charge
of Japan studies at the CATS operation at the University of Chicago; but the
dropping of the atomic bombs brought an end to that enterprise. Her role in
the CATS program was the closest Mears came Lo a conventional academic career
in Asian studies.
Shortly after the war, in February of 1946r lu1ears returned to Japan, this
time in an official capacity, as member of an e1-even-person labor advisory
conmittee. This second stay in Japan, together with a Houghton-Mifflin
Literary Fellowship after her return, led to her second book on Japan, Mirror
for Americans: Japan (1948). This title makes explicit the change in emphasis
from Wild Boar. Wild Boar \^tas a report on how Japan in 1935 appeared to an
interested American observer. Mirror is a didactic book, a polemic, an attempt
to draw from Japanrs experience lessons for Americans, a book about American
images of Japan and Asia. A survey of Western relations with Asia, it is an
attack on American policy toward Asia.
The publication of Mirror in 1948 marks the emergence of Mears as a full-
scale critic of American policy in Asia. Her focus in Mirror is on the back-
ground of the Pacific Inlar; and the lessons she draws from that analysis are
decisive for virtually all of her later writing. As she recalled in early
L978: "Everything Itve done has come out of my studies which resulted in
Mirror. The patterns were perfectly clear then... Of course, events moved so
10fast. One war after another. I didnrt think theyrd come that fast."
-5-
Mirror received a mixed reception, roith the academic reviewers somewhat
more hostile than the general reviewers. Nathaniel peffer contrasted Mirro!
unfavorably with Wild Boar and conrnented: t'Here she is only provir,rg that a
little historical learning is a pecuriarly dangerous thing.,,1lHorrrd p.
Linton \^irote caustically: ItNear-fanaticism and want of realism lessen the
value of the book."12 John M. Maki called Mirror'r...3 bold and sincere
statement of one l^tomanrs sentiments on the protrlems of international relations
in the modern world and on the occupation of Japan. To regard it as a seri.ous
analysis of those problems would be to place it in a category for which, it
is to be hoped, it was not intended...,,13 Among the specialist reviewers, only
John Fee Embree was enthusiastic. In a formal review Embree compared Mears
with an illustrious predecessor: Mirror \^ras "...a treatment after the manner
of Thucydides -- with due attention to the distinction between acts and pious
words in relations between states."14 Two years later, as part of a biting
attack on ethnocenlrism among American anthropologists, Embree would add:
"He1en Mears, a journalist wilh no anthropological training, has written an
account of Japanese-American relations which te1ls more about why the two
countries \^renE to war than all the anthropologists put togethur.,,15
Houghton Mifflin, Mirrorfs pubrisher, sought permission from the
Occupation authorities for a Japanese lranslation, but permission \4tas denied.
"Because of my abhorrence of any form of censorship or the restrictj-on of the
freedom of expressionrrr wrote Douglas MacArthur, ttl undertook, personally, to
review the book...t' He considered ttrc book propaganda and a threat to the
public safety: "...there appears no justification whatsoever for its publi-
cation in occupied Japan.r' MacArthur objected both to Mirrorrs history __
"Indeed, in the technique of slanting, misrepresentation and perversion of
the historical record, not even the propagand.a emanating from Soviet sources
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is that of the non-orgaqization man [Mears was an admirer of c. wright Mills ].
The independent, rugged-individualist, the man from Missouri... who at one time
was assumed to be the normal American but who is a vanishing breed.,,19
Not surprisingly, lhese activities sLood in the way of her book-length
projects. In a letter of March 1962, she writes: "Of course, I should keep
to my long-term work and get a book done, and stop bothering about current
affairs. But at the rate events are shaping up, by the time my Great works
are in publishable form, there \nronrt be any point in publishing them, or any
others. 
. .or even any means to. . .,,20
Mears did not travel again to Japan or to Asia, but she did not need to.
Based in New York city, with government documents and the major Engtish-
language newspapers as her source material, she carved out for herself a career
as critic, as conscience. Her modus operandi and much of her message are
reminiscent of r. F. stone. Mears agrees that the parallel is valid. Early
in 1978 she commented wryly: 'tThe major difference between I. F. Stone and
me is that he knew how to put together a ne\dsletter and get it circulated.n
rndeed, herein lies one of the lessons to be learned from the case of Helen
Mears: that ir was possible in rhe 1940s and 1950s, working sorely from
published sources in L{estern languages, to develop a compelling critique of
American policy in Asia, to see what was going to happen.
II. Japan.
rn the opening chapter of Mirror, Mears establishes an extended metaphor
for the whole book and, indeed, for all her writing about Asia. Her trip
across the Pacific by plane becomes an embodiment not simply of the machine
age but also of the sudden expansion of American power into the pacific.
She writes (pp. I-7):
The Army Plane on the last lap of a San
left Guam at ten-fifteen in the morning
Francisco-Atsugi run had
and was streaking for
-B-
Japan. With no sensation of motion it appeared to hang balanced
between sky and sea so that, unless r looked out of the porLhole,
it was hard to remember that we were rushing through the air at the
rate of over t\nlo hundred and fifty miles an hour. Even looking
out, unless there were clouds below or around us, the effect was
merely like sitting on a high hill looking down over a spreading
seascape. This lack of sensation was almost frightening. To be
using poriter which you did not understand and of which you could be
unahrare \^tas a privilege that carried terrible dangers. Your life
depended on the quality of leadership in the men who planned the
routes, who serviced the planes, who performed the job of keeping
on the true course, of controlling the motors. The passengers,
once in Lhe plane, were powerless to alter course, powerless to
help themselves. It was necessary to surrender completely to the
pilots and crew and to the men who had chosen the goal and plotted
the route. If they failed, we all crashed with them.
En route to her assignnent with the Occupation, Mears considers herself
rrhelplessly involved in an undertaking as potenrially dangerous to all
Americanstt as a plane flight. ttThe occupationrtt she r^lritesrtt... was the
climax of an American demonstration of controlled power on such a vast
unprecedented sca1e, and with such possibility for future disaster" that
inspired leadership was crucial. Things seemed to be going well; but planes
often crashed without warning: trA rnonentary appearance of order rdas no
guarantee of safety to those who worked with overwhelming power. Power was
too complex ever to be taken for granted. The more po\4rer you had, the greater
the possibility for violent and overwhelming disastcrr."
According to Mears, the fundamenLal problem was rrthis power ageril the
modern era rrthat had its roots back in the fifteenLh century with the
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invention of the compass and the gun; that had thrust up its solid trunk along
with steam and electric power; that had branched out and flowered with the
thousand mechanical contrivances to conquer nature and men, to bring con-
venience, comforts, and destruction; and fina1ly, to produce in darkness
the dubious fruit that had exploded terror over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.rr
This power age was marked by crisis: rtan amalgam of unsolved economic,
social, and psychological problems that developed along with the industrial
revolution and the machine-po\^?er age." This power age had rr...created a
state of nationalistic hysteria that had affected certain nations sooner than
others, and some nations to a greater degree than others, but progressively,
during the twentieth century, had infected the entire world., rn Japan in
1935, she had seen that hysteria take its tol1: "I was alarmed then by the
unanimity of opinion among all I talked to. It was almosE as thoughrinstead
of having a brain, each one had a victrola in his head that played over and
over the identical record.r'
But during the hTar years in America she saw Americans, too, succumb to
the same disease: tt...I was appallccl to discover that Americans seemed to
have, inslead of a brain, the same sorL of victrola as the Japanese...,, This
discovery cast new light on the origins of the pacific I^Iar: "...what had been
ltrong in Japan \^tas not a naturally aggressive leadership and a uniquely
acquiescenL people, but instead an international and domestic situafion thal
made the idea of crisis and war easily believed. It was the rstate of crisisr
that was the villain of the piece both in Japan and in America. rf world
hlar II were not to be merely the rniddle act of a three-act tragedy, il was
the crisis that must be examinecl .,1
The'rmost crucial" problem posecl by this crisis was that ilof directing
and controlling political polirer in a world in which the people's welfare is
increasingly dependent on government, and in which international relations are
I0-
concurrently interdependent and antagoni-stj-c.tr In hindsight, the Japanese --
people and leaders -- were helpless; theyrrcould no more have controlled the
forces that $rere thrusting them into the slipstream of dangerous and dynamic
power than could a passenger control ar-r airplane in the midst of a power
dive." In this light Japanrs expelience becomes an object lesson: "To
study Japan objectively is to clarify the problems and contradictions of our
turbulent age, and to plot a trend that can be extended, with considerable
aSsurance, into the future.tr Indeed: tt...the stoly of Japants abrupE rise
from peaceful isolationism to militaristic expansionism in its brief modern
period is, in capsule form, the history of the I'Iestern World for the past
four centuries. "
Japan has already crashed; and so Mears' real concern is with America.
She writes: "Our crisis started building r^iirh the First trlor1d I,rlar and has
accelerated, during the Second, to an exhilarating and dangerous pol^7er dive.
Unlike the Japanese, we have swung into it with apparently everything in our
favor. With power, however, too much can be as dangerous as too little.
With our velocity, only a miracle of intelligent planning, disciplined
control, and luck will bring us out of it without a ctash."
In this stunning opening passage Mears establishes her confext: not
Japan and the United States in the ten years before Pearl Harbor, not Japan
and the United Stares since Perry, but the international relations of Asia
since the arrival of the West. Her concern is less with individuals and
more wilh long-term geo-political forces. Most important, she places Japan
and America on an absolutely equal footing. Japan lost the Pacific War, and
lhe United States won iE; but the Pacific War is symptom, not disease, and
Japan and the United States both suffer from the disease. Victory does not
confirm the moral superiority of the victor. It confirms the victorrs
superiority of powelr 1l€s; but no more. She writes (p. a8): ttlf Americans
- 11-
are to fulfill the promise implicit in our political ideals and material
power, we will have Lo start from scratch and re-evaluate our role in the
war and our proposals for peace. For such a study Japan is a primer and
source-book. To review, objectively, our relations with Japan may serve as
a mirror to help us reassess our present policies in international relations.rl
The Pacific lalar
l,lears lays most of the blame for the Pacific War on I'the crisis.'r But
she does not suggest that lhe Japanese are free of all responsibility(p.f61):
'rThat modern post-Perry Japan has been aggressive and expansionist is clear.rr
Still, she notes that the same expansionism is not lrue of Japan before
Perry. Hence, Mears sees in the international conditions of the late 19th
cenLury the key to the change (p.175): "The modern Japanese developed a
highly centralized regime because they were introduced into wcr 1d society
under conditions that made centralized control of both government and economy
essential to survivat. They became 'violent and greedyr because they were
i.ntroduced into a world sociely in which violence and greed were standard
and correct behavior...tt
Japanrs drive for empire, Mears suggests (p.296), is nothing new in
Asia: I'For centuries Asia and the pacific Islands have been a Co-prosperity
Sphere for Europe and, to a minor degree, the United States." In that context
of Western colonialism and imperialism, Mears writes (p.264), Japan became
"despite herself...the spearhead of Asiatic nationalistic revolution.rf Later,
writing of Japan's expulsion of the Western rulers from their colonies in
Asia, Mears cormnents (p.273) that the Japanese "...emerged -- even if dis-
honestly -- as the leaders oftAsiatic liberation.rtr After the outbreak of
the China IncidenL, Mears notes (p.273), the Japanese I'proceeded with
ruthless brutality.rr So Mears holds no brief for the Japanese, as some
reviewers charged at the Lime.
-12-
Second, Mears Lraces the history of Western relations with China, sketching
out the prewar his tory essential to an urrdcrs tanding of pos tirar evellts . For
example, she notes (p.219) that the open Door: policy, far from protecting
chinats sovereignty, tt\n/as, in practice, a dcnial of it . the issue was
only, Can the Western Powers (including.Iapan) irgrec amolrg themselvcs not to
go so far in turning China into a colony th;rt thcy cxclude cach other from
trade and investments?tt It is for this rcason that l'lears speaks (p.26Q of
Itthe failure of the democracies" on "the moral sidc" in clealing with thc
Manchurian Incident. They sought not to abolish thc unequal treaties but to
re-establish the staEus quo.
Similarly, Americans tt...must face the fact that there is remarkably
little correlation between moral principles and intcrnational law.'t To Mears,
power politics is the real issue, and thc Manchurian Incident one not atypical
case study. She writes (p.207): "From the Asiatic point of view [which Mears
contrasts with public opinion in thc Unj-tcd StaLcs] , the Incidcr.rl- vras a
highly elaborate examplc of tr:rclitional lowcr politics irr which Jilpan and
the other Western po\.^iers tradcd 1egal fictions with each other." And Mears
does not hesitate to add a third point of view -- the Chinese -- which saw
all parties as having a conrmon objective: that of rrmaintaining or extending
the rinterestst of rhe Western Powers in the Far East.r'
Mears quotes (p.270) Joseph Grew to the effect that Japanl^ras outrrto
supersede British interests in China,rr ilnd she cites president Rooseveltts
statement on the import-ance of kceping the Japancsettwithin boundsttinsof.rr
as territorial changes wcre concerned. Sho rcpot:ts that ther Japancse govern-
menL interpreted Britisl'r opposition to Jap.rncsc policy in thc 1930s as imperial
in nature, and American opposition as bascrd on ilracial, commercial, and
strategic objections.t' She writes (p.27L): "The major antagonists in the
China Incident lrere not China and Japan. They were still Japan and the other
- 13-
Western Powers, 1arge1-y Britain and the United States. There were Chinese
generals and policicians on both the Anglo-American and Japanese sides of
Lhe argument. The Chinese people, as usual, were the victims of everybody,
and had no role except to be starved and killed."
For Mears, World War II began before Pearl Harbor, and the United States
had already taken sides. She writes ( p.274): "The United States Government
took part in the China Incident (which, in practical terms, merged with the
World War in L93g), not only by lending large sums to Chiang Kai-shek, but
also by threatening to impose stringent economic sanctions against Japan.rl
Between 1939 and Pearl Harbor, American policy was devious (pp.274-275): "In
practical terms our policy was designed to keep t.he Sino-Japanese War going
until the European War was under control and until our tdefenset program
\^ras further advanced. The Japanese were kept busy in China, and Chiang Kai-
shek was given help enough so that he would continue fighting and not yield
to the Japanese. We interpreLed this policy as being to the best interests,
not only of Britain, but also of the American and Chinese people." Not
surprisingly, Mears lays great emphasis on the American oil embargo of July
I94L (p.277): "... the Japanese knew that the ultimatum they had been
dreading since the Manchurian Incident had come at last. lJithout supplies
from these Powers, the Japanese raould have to get out of China and Manchuria
on American, British and Dutch terms. They had to be prepared to fight or
submit to terms that would reduce them to a minor Power.rt
Much of what lr{ears writes about the Pacific War seems unremarkable today.
This impression tells us a good deal about today, but little about L948. In
1948 American public opinion was not ready for Mirror; and neither, by and
1arge, were American Japanists. To many Americans studying and writing about
Japan, the Pacific War had been anything but a conventional struggle for
empire. Japan in the 1930s, they fclt, offered a mortal threat not to assumed
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American strategic interests or to the Arneric.ln economy, but to the American
way of life, to ttdemocracy.tt For them, the war was less a po\4rer struggle
than a crusade.
For example, Edwin O. Reischauer, Americats leading ..Iapanist of the post-
war years, had spokerr out in June of 1942 in a radio series on "The Fight
for a Free World.tt This is how he bcgan: "In J:rpan we clo not facc merely a
military enemy or a rival in a game of powcr politics. Jzrpern represents a
political, economic, and social system which is a direct challcnge fo our
o\^in ways of life and thought. Japan is nof sinpl.y an cnemy nation. It
represents an enemy ideology which is threatening to drive the ideas of
democracy, equality, and individual frecdom from the Far East and which is
aLtempting to win the uncounted ntillions of Asia to a system characterized by
the mass slavery of totalitarianism, Lhe bitter hatrcds of ultranationalism,
and the cruelty and oppression of milita.i"*."21 Many of these themes he
wotrld develop in The United States and Japan (1950), although by then
Reischauer found it necessary to splil- tlrc role of anti.-Chris t: for t.ire
prewar years it still belonged Lo J;rpan, but for the postwar years it now
became the Soviet Unionts.
A second
the forefront
example is John M. I'Iaki, a political scientist soon to be in
of Americars Japan scholars. He began his JapaLrese Militarism:
Its Cause and Cure (L945) by talking of two wars: one against people, the
second against ideas. He \,trote (p.2): "If we could carry ttre war against
people to its logical conclusion and kill scventy-tno million Japanese, we
should not have to worry about thc winning of ttre war of ideas. llodern
weapons have not yet reached the point whetc they can anrrihilate a nation; \^re
must accept the fact that there will be er good many million Japanesc still
living r,ihen this war comes to an end. lfhe war of ideas involves these people."
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Some Japanisls attacked Mears; more ignored her. Few reading lists of
the 1950s included Mirror; and it is not to be found in most bibliographies
of the period. But thirty years laler, it is clear that Mears anticipated
much of the revisionist history of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Noam
Chomsky deserves great credit for his essay of L967 examining the roots of
the Pacif,ic Wart22 but most of his themes are present already in Mirror.
Had they not ignored Helen Mears, American Japanists would have had less
need of Noam Chomsky twenty years later
America and Japan, 1945-1952
The American Occupat.ion of Japan rested firmly and comfortably on the
American wartime propaganda which "...re1ieved Americans of any responsibil-ity
whatsoever, and indicted a people, never popular, as the so1e, deliberate,
and unprovoked offender..u(MirJor p.13). That connection made it inevitable
that Mears extend her critique of prer4rar American policy to postwar policy,
too. Mears intended to follow up Mirror with a book on the Occupation, but
'rthe rapidity with vshich my insights turned into events in the postr,Jar period
the developing Cold War with Ehe U. S. S. R., the war in Korea, the fanatic
anti-Communism (which echoed the Axis anti-Comintern pact), the issue of tRed
Chinar and the U. N., the devastating war in Indochina -- made the current
policies (which so painfully reproduced the past) seem a more urgent topic."23
Why should there be an American Occupation of Japan at all? This is a
simple question, perhaps; but to ask ir ir-r 1948 one had to be immune to the
bacillus of American wartime propaganda. Hence, it is noL normally abked in
American writings on Japan. But for Helen Mears it is an obvious question,
and she seeks to answer it. For her, the Occupation isItpart of our postwar
plans for the future, rather than of our war efforts. We did not occupy Japan
as a necessary step to winning the war; we insisted on the Occupation as a
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condition of allor^ring the Japanese to surrencler. " She continues (Mirror
pp.49-50):"TheOccupationofJapan"'wasanobjectiveofour\^'ar'But
r^ihat was the objective of our Occupation? The answer seems too easy' and
could probably be summed up with the simple declaralive staLement Iofficial
policy,aswidelyreportedinthewartimepress]:rPutthemdownandkeep
them down.' If further presse<l' most Americans would probably go on to say
that we are trying totdemocratize the Japanese so that they wontt eternally
be waging war.,,, Hence (pp.52-53) the Occupati.on iS ''very fax indeed from
being a philanthropic gesture"' Expressed in its most obvious terms' the
Occupation is a demonstration of cops-and-robber:s on an international scale'rl
But Mears does discuss an addirional objective of Ametican policy in
1945andafter:theconlainmentofttreSovietUnion.Shediscusses(pp.108.109)
Lhe rush to end the war by force despite Lhe fact 'rthat for at least three
months 
,[the Japanese] had been trying to discuss sulrenclel'rr Her conclusion
is a stark onet ,'...\^re wele perfectly willing to massacle ovel a hundred
thousand Japanese civilians in an attcrmpt to bring a quick decision' And we were
quiLeready,ifthisfailed,togoalrtladwiththeplannedil'rvasionatthe
possible sacrifice of hundreds of thotrsands of American lives' And the atom
bombs which we used against the Japanese wete used, noE in a war against
Japan, for Japan had alreacly been overwhelmingly defeated, but in a political
war against Russia. And our occupation is a device for carrying out certain
political and economic objectives which ale connected wich the Japanese only
in the sense that they...happen to inhabit some strategically placed islands'r'
Helen Mears was not the first to suggest that the American motivation in
dropping the atomic bombs was to impress the Soviet Union, but she may well
have been Ehe first expert on Asia to confront the issue' Edwin O' Reischauel'
for example, ignores the issue in Th-e united states and Japan; in fact' in
none of his writings does Reischauer go beyond fhe statement that 
r""the
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Americans, without stopping to think fully about what they were doing, pro-
ceeded...to droprt'the atomic bo*b".24 For Reischauer the controversy sur-
rounding atomic diplomacy is simply not a topic of concern or interes!.
For many people today the dropping of the atomic bombs is one of the
great war crimes of the Pacific Warl but at the major pacific war crimes
trial at rokyo, only Japanese acts r{ere under judgment, and the emphasis
was less on conventional war crimes than on the crime of aggression. While
in Tolcyo, Mears attended one session of the Tokyo trial. Mirror appeared
before the trial drew to a close; but between 1949 and 1954 Mears studied the
records of both Nuremberg and Tokyo and prepared a prospectus for a book on
the trial. However, she found no publisher, and the project died. what
remains is a portion of a manuscript and an entry, ttwar crimes trials,tt in
the Coliier's Encyclopedia (1954; the entry is still running in the L977
edition). Once again, Mears is far ahead of her time, for the first critical
monograph on the trial in any western language appeared in j-97L.
Mears is attracted by the ideals behind the trial. A firm believer in
the principle that international 1aw should supersede power politics and
war' as the charter and judgmenE of the Tokyo trial assert, Mears writes:
'rThe importance of these new principles of international law cannot be
overstated.rr But as always she insists on comparing ideal and real, for nthe
danger...of asserting such idealistic principles only to illustrate their
unreality in practice is that the whole concept of International- Law is weak-
ened if not wholly discredited.rt Later in the essay she r.rriges that "...the
appointment of the American defense attorneys, which was the most obvious
demonstration of American high concepts of legal justice, had, in the end,
the paradoxical resutt of illustrating how far Americans' conception of
international justice is removed from American domestic standards.,,25
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The essay comes to no conclusions; and the prose of the encyclopedia
entry, not surprisingly, is fairly matter-of-fact. Sti11, she writes there
that Nuremberg and Tokyo "introduced into inlernational society some revolu-
tionary definitions, principles, and procedures of international 1aw." Of
eleven paragraphs on Tokyo, tvto are about the many separate judicial opinions,
with the emphasis on fundamental problems of legal principle and procedure.
She reports the action of the U. S. Suprcme Court in denying that it had
jurisdiction, quotes Associate Justice William O. Douglas, who wrote that
the trial lqas Itsolely an instrument of political por\7er, " and leaves the reader
with no doubt that the issues are still open: "The importance of the War
Crimes Trials has yet to be assessed. Those who wrote the charters, and
those who judged the defendants as guilty, asserted the existence of a body
of international criminal law, which supcrrseded national 1aw and by which
governments and people are bound. Others have questioned the existence of
such international 1aw and have charged Lhat the trials represented only a
victor's vengeance or a demonstration of power politi""."26 For an encyclo-
pedia entry of 1954, and especially for zrn entry which covers both Tokyo
and Nuremberg, these are startling words.
In her writings about the war and the Occupation, and indeed in her
writings about American policy in general, Mears consistently inveighs
against the naive and easy self-assurance with which Americans have addressed
themselves to issues of enormous complexity and deep historical roots. In
Mirror she questions the competence of Americans to "reformt' Japanese insti-
tutions, to make Japan "peace-loving,t'the declared objective of the Occupation
The plane which took her to Japan in 1946 also carried some of the other
members of the labor advisory cormnittec, and they illustrated the problem.
With indignation she writes of them (p.38): "'fhey wcrc, personally, serious
and civil ized -- competent irr Lhcrir own f iclcl s in Aureric:r. Irew of the
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Americans, however, had so much as read a book about Japan. They had not
followed the events of the Occupation in the ne\^/spapers. Most of them had
never heard of the 'Pauley Report,'although this was, at that time, the
basic document defining Japan's economic future and so the future of the
Japanese worker whose problems we were supposed to advise about. Moreover,
their lack of Japanese background did not in the least bother them. Their
attitude was that (a) there were certain basic economic principles which were
universally true...and (b) we hrere, in any event, not interested in what
Japan had been, si-nce our job was to turn Japan into what we wanted it to be.
One of the members carried with him slim volumes of Aristotle and Machiavelli,
rrhich -- during the flight out -- he had browsed in from time to time getting
a firm grasp on basic principles."
This combination of self-confidence and yet basic ignorance struck Mears
as Lypical of the whole Occupation. Her reaction was sharp (p.37): r,Americans
had, in fact, and no nonsense about it, taken on the role of Roman conqueror
and reformer with fewer qualms and less self-questioning than they would, at
home, advise their wives about the purchase of a new hat, The eztreme self-
discipline and co-operativeness of the Japanese served t.o give an illusion of
stability that reinforced the dangerous self-assurance of the reformers.rl
The Occupation of Japan came to an end formally in 195 I-1g52 when the
United States and Japan negotiated a multi-lateral peace treaty and signed. a
bi-lateral security treaty. The security treaty extended the American
rnilitary presence






in Japan past the end of the Occupation. Helen Mears is
American writers to express serious doubts about these events
of 1950' accepted for publication in The Nation but never
appointment of John Foster Dulles as chief
that neither Russia rror China will be party to
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the treaty, and the prospect that the United States will insist on long-term
military rights and bases. Such a peace, she suggests, will seem provocative
to both China and Russia. Is the root cause of the separate treaty Russian
intransigeance? No: "The record...suggests that intransigeance is an
occupational disease of all Great Powers." Japan, she contends, is milirarily
indefensible and should choose neutrality, but the United States will not
accept such a course: rrWe have taught the.Iapanese to prefer neutrality, We
should stop our projects for making that neutralil-y impossibLe."2T
The administrative agreement setting forth the terms of the security
arrangement was concluded on February 28, L952, and within a month Mears takes
her stand. Her essay, entitled I'The Japanese 'Insecurityr Treaty,rr appeared
in the March 22 issue of The Nation. Mears makes several fundamental points
about the security arrangement. Flrst, the treaty is not voluntary on the
part of Japan. She writes: "To clainr that the secur:ity treaty is a'vo1-
untary agreement between free peoplest (as Secretary of State Dean Acheson
expressed it) when one of the signers is an occupied nation and the other
the occupier is to put a peculiar interpretation upon tvoluntaryrand'freet.
As a matter of fact, the Japanese ri/ere told from the first that they would
get no peace tTeaty unless and until they ratified the security treaty In
short, we made no bones about it -- no bases, no peace treaty.rr Further, the
treaty reestablishes extraterritoriality; it has evoked significant opposition
in Japan; and it permits the use of American troops to put dor,rn domestic
insurrection in Japan. Most important, Mears argues that as far as Japan is
concerned the treaty "...offers the reverse of security." Not only is the
American pledge to defend Japan vague and non-comrnittal, but Japan will become
involved in any American action: "...Japants parl-icipation in any military
adventure involving the United States or lhe United Nations becomes automatic.
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we may contemplate this situation with great satisfacti-on, but the war-weary
Japanese can hardly be expected to do so.,,2B
Almost twenty years were to pass before the issues Mears raises in this
article of L952 received the serious atlenti.on of academic Japanists. For
them, an article in the in late 1969
represented the first attempt to'rbring the war home," to explore in the
realm of relations between America and Japan some of the questions raised
by the American involvement in rndochina. In that essay of late 1969 John W.
Dower analyzes at length the security arrangement in terms not of American
magnanimity but of American self-interest. He argues that the treaty was
"an unequal treaty in the fullest. sense, of the term; that the treaty gave
rrrise to legitimate resentment and fear among many Japanese;,rand that "by
treing forced into a rigid anti-cornrnunist ro1e, Japan may have increased
rather than decreased its vu1nerabilitr.,,29
As we have seen, Helen Mears gave voice to all these issues in 1952. A
non-academic Japanist, she enjoys clear priority of p1ace, yet it is
indicative of the state of affairs that her essay does not appear in the notes
to Dowerrs article. The point here is not to denigraLe Dowerts contribution,
for his essay was important in stimulating rethinking within the field, but
to underline the costs that academic Japanists have paid for their failure to
listen to Helen Mears.
IIT. Vietnam
The study of the international relations of the pacific in the years
before 1941 led naturally to a concern with postwar reality, with American
policy not simply toward Japan but toward all of Asia. In the 1950s Helen
Mears publishes articles on okinawa, on China, on Korea, and on Vietnam.30
Apart from Japan, Vietnam is the major focus of her efforts, and it is these
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articles in particular which testify to her foresight. The colonial issue
forms a natural bridge between the Pacific War and postwar Vietnam, but Mears
is perhaps the first to walk across it. Even before the Pacific War comes
Eo a c1ose, she publishes (June 1944) an article entitled I'Japan is winning
the political war." By this she means the political
rrThe conflict in the Far East involves a great deal
war in Asia. She begins:
more than the defeat of
the Japanese. Il involves our relations with all the Asiatic and South Sea
Island peoples." Japan had appealed to these peoples and had won wide
acceptance as t'the spearhead of an Asiatic nationalist revolution.tt Hence,
she writes: tt...we cannot rliberatet these regions from the Japanese without
making definite and concrete arrangements for their early independence."
Real political and economic issues underlay the Japanese attack on the
United States. Tn the same way: r'...behind Japan's expansion and the
revoluEionary upsurge in Asia there arc genuirie economic and social problems.
If they are not solved, even the total demolition of Japan and the Japanese
will not be enough Eo gain us peace in the Pacific." Mears offers her own
prescription: "We are obliged to choose now whether we want to run the world
by co-operation or spend the rest of the century in war. We can make a start
by an unequivocal statement that we consider the rights of the native peoples
in Asia and the Pacific paramount in these regions and that when such rights
seem at variance with our assumed interests, our interests must give way and
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native rights take precedence." The nationalist revolutions Mears foresees
in T944 come with startling rapidity after 1.945.
Mearsr first article on Vietnam appears in April 1953 -- before the
French debacle at Dienbienphu, before the Geneva Conference. The title itself
is prophetic: "Our newest war: the mess in Indochina." The inrnediate
occasion for the article is the visit to Washington of French Premier Rerie
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Mayer (March 1953), in search of American aid for the French in Indochina.
The joint comnqnique issued at the close of the visit is what worries Mears,
and she writes: t'The ne\n/ tpositivet American policy in Indochina.,.puts the
United States into the war in Indochina..." Further, she ties the war in
Indochina to the issue of nationalism and surveys recent Vietnamese history:
'rThe French, of course, have charged -- and of late the United States has
echoed the charge -- that rhe original vietnam Republic of Ho and his
Vietminh is dominated by Communists working in the interest of the Kremlin.
But the facts as reported by Arnericarr ncwspaper correspondents strongly
sug€lest that, vrhatever the extent of (lomnrunist influence, the major operative
factor has been and is nationalism. Ilo Chi-minh was a nationalist, anli-
monarchist revolutionary before the Russian Revolution. ..,,32
In an unpublished essay dated April L954 -- during the siege of Dien-
bienphu but before the Geneva Conference, Mears explores another aspect of
the American j-nvolvement in Indochina: its 1egality. Entitled "Indochina:
Illegal Warr this essay analyzes ttrc situation in terms of the Charter of
the United Nations and the verdict of the Tokyo trial (of which she conrnents
bitingly,rrThe general indifference to these records does not expunge them
from the pages of history"). llcrc is her concltrsion:
ttlt seems clear that under existing commitments, no nation, or
alliance of nations, can lega1ly use force unless specifically
authorized to do so by the correct procedures as defined in the
U. N. Charter. No nation, or group of nations, can constitute
themselves a U. N. police force without formal authorization.
The Governments of the Great Powers can of course take the law
into their own hands. If they do so, ho\n/ever, they are not
helping to establish a world under law, but are themselves 1aw-
-. 
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breakers, leading rhe world backward toward international
anarchy. They also risk being charged as War Criminals,
guilty of the rcrime against peace' which has been declared
to be rthe supreme international crime. "'33
It would be the end of the 1960s, a decade and more later, before the
criminality of the Vietnam war became a topic of serious discussion. But
Mears had sketched out the basic outlines of an argument in 1954, before
the Geneva Conference.
Seven years later, in Novernber 1961, she \,/rote to President John F.
Kennedy protesting reports of arms-shipments and stepped-up action in Vietnam:
ttlf this isntt waging an undeclared war against the Vietnamese people --
what is it? Even if the rebels are Communist-led, the rebels and their leaders
are Vietnamese -- natives of this area, fighting in their own counLr:y. It is
the Americans who are the foreign intruders." In this letter too she raises
the issue of legality: 'rSuppose the U. S. Government were cal1ed on to defend
it successfully in view of the Geneva agreements and the U. S. obligations
under the U. N. Charter?"34
In L962 Mears wrote of "The Big Risks of Little Wars.'r Her text was a
report on Pentagon strategy which had appeared in the Wall Street Journal. In
typical fashion Mears draws from the report the implications which other
readers did not see:
ItWhat does this report reveal, in essence, about U. S. planning?
It says that to put into po\^/er in South Vietnam a regime which
does not have 'solid supportt from the people, the United States
is waging war againsL native rebels and is prepared to carry
out guerilla warfare againsL North Vietnam; the report adds that
if the United States cannot subdue the native rebels within a
few years by using these methods, it will bomb North Vietnam.
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rf the Chinese intervene -- either before the open attack
against North vietnam or after -- the united states is pre_
pared to carry ther rrrar to china. rt is hoped that the u. s.
s. R. will stay out of it. Ilorrriver, this is a risk that must
be accepted.
"when such poricy planning is statec bl*'tly *- without the
customary circumlocutions of .trr anti-comm.rrrisr id,e'log-y __
it sor'rds prei)osterJ*s., yct fcr: o\,/.lr a year our press has
been full of grimly realistic d,lscripl_itns,:f thr: situation
in Soutir Vielrri-rir -- and t-re f rustrati,xs of American planners
who have deterinined tha!: vietnain is a rpiece of stral-egic real
estate'which the united states must not 'yield to the Recls.r
'rAdmittedly, the probrem of gaining rvictoryr lies in the
widely publicized fact that- thc peopre of vietnam prefer the
'Redst to 'our man Diem.r This situation has little, if
anything, to do with conrnunist ideology. The important poinr
is that many rebels called .communistst are not connnunists.
and even the communists, both south and North, are native
vietnamese. when the u. s. government, in effect, tells the
vietnamese 'Redsr to go back where they came from or be kilred,
it puts both the 'Reds' and the American people in a difficult
position. For these vietnamcse 'Rcdsr arc already where they
came from. rt is the Americans who are a rong way from hom".,,35
Thus, between L944 and 1962 lIelcn Mears develops a critique of the
American involvement in Vietnam whicir stands Lrp very well today. Needless
to say, most Americans took uruch longer to see the truth in her argument,
and so did most American Asian scholars. At the time she wrote, Mears was
clearly out of step with her time.
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IV. Helen Mears and American Asianists.
For more than thirty years Helen Mcars has provided a highly intelligent
and informed criticism of American policy in Asia. She has done so under
conditions far from ideal: her highest degree is a B.A.; she is not competent
in any Asian language; she has not been to Asia since 1946. An outsider to
the academy, she has not enjoyed the advantages of the insiders: tenure,
Fulbright grants, university-press publications.
Academic Asian scholars had all these advantages during the same time
but produced litt1e fundamental criticism. Language study, area travel and
research grants, university presses anxious to publish monographs -- these
becarne almost routine in the life of academic Asian schol-ars. However, in
retrospect it seems clear that the best and the brightest of the Asian
academy, like their political counterparts in Washington, were not up to
the real challenge. They did not examine the rooLs of American policy in
Asia; they did not see the connections between American policy toward Japan
and American policy toward Vietnam. They did not speak out and take unpopular
stands. Their absorption in Asia left them blind to reality at home.
Helen Mears was not so buried in research that she paid little attention
to contemporary issues. She was not so intent on being a Japanist that she
ignored develop'ments in China, Korea, or Vietnam. She was not so absorbed
in Asia that she ignored developments in her own country. Only shortly
out of college when she first went to China, shc learned about the complex-
ities of international relations from expcrience and study, trying always
to understand Asian points of view. Her study of Asia led her back to the
United States and enabled her to see her own country in a new light. As a
result, she began to see her governrnent's foreign policies in a global
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context and to examine them in relation to the ideals and goals professed
by the makers of American policy.
This contrast between her feasance and the malfeasance of Americars
'Asian scholars calls for some explanation. To Mears, looking back in Lg7g,
the crux of the matter is independence: she was independent; most Asian
scholars were not. They thought of themselves, she suggests, as colleagues
of the policy-makers rather than as watchdogs. They considered their role
to be heLping to implement policy rather than trying to insure that the
policy lived up to the professed principles and goals. says Mears today:
rrTndependence is the r^rord. rrve been an independent person."
Mears takes seriously the principles that many American policy-makers
have used as window-dressing. Sl-re consj-ders herself a 'rgenuine internation-
alist.rr Today she still refers with deep feeling to the passage from John
Quincy Adams which she used as an epigraph for Mirror. Adams wrote of
America: "Wherever the s[andard of freedom and independence has been or
shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions, and her prayers
be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.,, Mears adds:
I'Now that's the way I think A,merica should be. "
For all the fire of her polemic and the consistency of her thinking,
Mears is not ideological. one of her most characteristic essays appeared
in 1959 under the title "Militarism is impractical.r' There she writes:
"...politica1 decisions which i-gnore the 'morally rightr seldom turn ouL to
be rpoliti-ca1ly sound,r for foreign-policy decisions based on military
judgments seldom prove to be wise, even in terms of military and sgrategic
advantage.tr she continues: rt...those who rely on rnilitary power as the
major element in their policy-making do not try to relax international
tensions; they do not try to solve international problems" Instead, they
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try to impose stability, even on situations which are artificial, unjust
and unworkable from the point of view of the people who live in Lhe strategic
regions."36 Solid connnon sense is a major element in the Mears formula.
Mears is extremely reluctant to talk of her own religious beliefs.
she feels that the issue is a personal one, not for public display.
Organized Christianity has given Christianity a bad name, and so have John
Foster Du11es, Bi1ly Graham, and Jimmy carter. The issue, she fee1s, is not
her religion but the way policy-makers have invoked Christianity to justify
thoroughly un-Christian policies. But in the l95Os Mears wroLe a number of
articles for the Episcopal journal Witness, and these articles reveal that
she is as comfortable expressing her message in the terms of the Church as
in the more secular language she uses for her other articles. In one of
these articles, published in 1951, she expresscs her ornrn conviction that
rrAs a basis for a wortd united under law the principles of Christianity seem
mankindts best hope."
In many hands such a statement could be ethnocentric to the core. But
not so in the case of Helen Mears. The passage continues: "This hope,
however, will be frustrated untit Americans, and Christians, become more
attentive to our own shortcomings, At this moment when our military power
is the most obvious fact of international relations $/e are in the gravest
danger of forgetting that might is not always identical with right. Surely
the Christian method for solving international tensions would be by mediation,
conciliation, and a sincere effort to solve the problems which give rise to
international tension, rather than by force of 
"*".',37
Indeed, here is the source of the fire of her writings: hers is a
message not to the healhen but to the Greek, not to the Asian but to the
American. As early as 1948, Mearstprime concern is not Asia but the
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United States. Consider the title of her book -- Mirror for Americans: Japan.
Consider the fact that the metaphor of the airplane flight applies primarily
to the llnited States. Mears concludes the first chapter of Mirror (p.48):
"We are in mid-flight. It is about time the passengers on this power dive
begin to check up a little on the goal we are heading for and the quality
of the l-eadership that set the course and is directing the run." Mirror
concludes with Mearsr own appraisal of that leadership (p.324): ,'Our
current foreign-policy leaders...1ost in their dream of power and glory...
have become as blind to reality as the Japanese militarists before them.
The question for Americans to ansr^Ier, and answer at once, is whether we have
allowed our Power machine to get out of control or whether rire can sti11 take
over and reverse our direction.tt When most American intellectuals -- Asian
specialists included -- occupied themselves first and foremost with the sins
of our enemies -- the Japanese, the Russians, the Chinese, the Koreans, the
Vietnamese, Helen Mears focused attention on ourselves, on ttthe extreme
divergence of U. S. practice from U. S. ideology," on the 'rmoral schizophrerria
of our society," on the "moral callousness" of America"38
Fina11y, crucial to Mearsr faith is her basic humanity and her opposition
to oppression. Particularly poignant is an article Mears wrote for the
Christian Science Monitor Magazine of NIay 27, 1939. The title is "Culinary
Art of Japan," and the essay te1ls of a dinner i-rr a fine Tokyo restaurant
llundreds of writers have written hundrcds of similar articles; but Mearsl
ending sets her apart. She writes:
"Dinner over, fresh tea provide.s excuse to linger for a chat. In
no time the proprietor and his farnily discover that your country
is America, and will wish to know what America thinks of Japan...
what you yourself think of their country. You will exchange
courtesies. They will admire llenry Ford, of whom every Japanese
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seems to have heard favorably; you will praise the food or the
theater or the beauty of the country. your host vri1l answer to
the best of his ability your many q.estions. rt is only if you
speak of milit.arism in china that you break the spel1. Then he
will pause, his friendly garrulity will become formal courtesy,
and he will be sorry, but that is a subject abour which he has
no opinion. Self-conscious as though you had cormnitted a breach
of good manners, you will slip on your shoes. The family formally
bows, and as you go out to the cacophony of Tokyo, you think
regretfully how difficult it is today for individuals to meet
as human beings raEher than as members of some system.r'39
In Japan in 1935 Mears is not afraid to speak of Japanese militarism; but
her final thought is of conlmon humanity clespite racial or ideological
barriers.
Mears incurred the wrath of most Japanists of the 1940s, when her two
books appeared. Few reading lists of the 1950s included Mirror, and it is
not listed in the bibliographies of Reischauer (any book, any edition),
of Borton, of Kawai. As a result, most academic Japanists today have not
read her books and do noE know her name.
Yet Lhe conventional wisdom of 1948 seems highly parochial today; and
viewed in hindsight, Mears towers over those academic Japanists who could
not distance themselves from their time. She is not racist; she does not
condescend to Asia. She goes to Asia in search not of monsters to destroy
but of a mirror in which to rrreassess our present policies in international
relat ions. t'
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Clearly the field has paid a price for its cold shoul-der to Mears. The
spectrum of debate rnras narrowed artificially, and parochial patriotic views
soon achieved dominance. Writing of A. J. Muste's revolutiofiary pacifism as
it appeared in cont'rast to the policies America actually pursued in the
1930s, Noam Chomsky foundtrgreat tragedy'r in the fact that Mustets position
was so remote from'tthe American consciousrr.s".,,40 rt is surely no er<,ag-
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